2007, in particular in the three crises of Kosovo, 9/11, and Iraq. It follows, then, that the major foreign policy issues of that decade would have been dealt with differently had another person been prime minister.
As with Preston's scenario above, we cannot know for sure how history would have turned out if someone else had been in office and had faced those foreign policy challenges, but we can speculate in a more or less disciplined fashion by asking the Chancellor (now prime minister) Gordon Brown 2 . I suggest it is unlikely that either individual, had they been prime minister, would have made the same decisions as Blair, although we cannot, of course, know for certain. The overall goal is to isolate those decisions made by Blair that were shaped by his distinctive individual characteristics in order to consider "what difference he made". I conclude that the difference was rather large in Kosovo and Iraq, while after 9/11 Blair's worldview shaped the detail, but
probably not the broad outline, of the British response. The first step is to isolate the Blair worldview and approach to international politics.
The 'Blair Style' 3 If, as I contend, individuals matter in world politics, it is a worthwhile investment of our energies to develop some metrics by which to understand them. The subfield of political psychology has as one of its primary aims the application of insights concerning human cognition and personality to the special case of political leaders. This, of course, presents some challenges, but nonetheless substantial progress has been made in understanding the way in which the worldview and leadership style of political leaders impact upon their choices 4 .
Previous research on Blair's personality, conducted by systematic content analysis of his House of Commons performances for patterns of speech associated with specific beliefs and personality traits, has found that he is distinctive in several major ways, two of which bear directly on his foreign policy choices 5 . Firstly, he has a very high belief in his ability to control events, a perception of personal and national efficacy that has been linked to the pursuit of proactive and ambitious international policies. Secondly, he has a low conceptual complexity, an element of cognitive style linked to strongly held schema that are essentially dichotomous and unequivocal, and that has been observed in those with Manichean and absolutist foreign policy worldviews.
Colleagues and observers agree that Blair is an extremely proactive prime minister, with a propensity to discount the barriers to taking action and effecting change. Blair took a "much more forward leaning role" than his predecessor, and was, even prior to the Kosovo conflagration, "prepared and anxious that we should send our special forces out and capture war criminals who were actually being a malign influence on society". Blair, Guthrie confirms, was "prepared to go in unilaterally", and was frustrated both by the caution of the Americans and the torturous processes inherent in NATO decision making. He took bold decisions, and took them quickly, and so "as far as I'm concerned, he was certainly a much easier prime minister to work for than his predecessor John Major" 28 .
This change was also noticed by the Americans. "The British no longer had to be dragged along to confront the Serbs" once Blair was in charge, said a senior State for the exit'. This is to say that on many occasions circumstances will be so overwhelming as to preclude individual variation in response. On September 11 th , civilian citizens of the hegemonic power in the international system were killed en masse by a terrorist group with a transnational capacity and agenda, and an identifiable 'home base' of operations in Afghanistan. The policy response of the United States, in invading Afghanistan and removing the Taliban, was easily deducible from the circumstances.
Indeed, the widespread sympathy and support for the United States in the aftermath of the attacks is testimony to the clarity of imperatives inherent in the circumstances. This is to say that it is possible to explain Blair's solidarity with the US and his pledge of support without reference to his political psychology -any mainstream individual in the post of British prime minister would almost certainly have responded in basically this way.
However, once we move beyond the broad outline of policy and look at the detail, individual-level influences become more apparent. Blair's response to 9/11 did not stop with the expression of solidarity, but encompassed an incredibly ambitious agenda to eradicate the causes of terrorism -poverty, oppression, squalor -worldwide. This was seen among colleagues as Blair promising to single-handedly 'solve all of the world's problems', an impression enhanced when he launched himself on a diplomatic whirlwind tour in order to rally support for the United States. Moreover, Blair accepted the Bush administration's framing of the situation as a 'war on terror' to be fought primarily through military means and on a global scale. Not everyone in the UK government felt the same way. Clare Short noted that "all of us were horrified by the events of September 11 but most decent people are very worried by the bellicose statements from Bush and fearful of the US lashing out and killing lots of innocent Afghans and making things worse" 31 . While the broad structure of Blair's response seems to be a 'room on fire'
instance of situation overwhelming individual, the detail of Blair's response, in terms of its ambition and the acceptance of the Bush administration's stark framing of events, does seem more individually-determined.
It is, however, in Iraq that we find the most interesting fodder for a counterfactual.
Was Iraq a 'room on fire' case? Certainly, aspects of the circumstances surrounding the conflict would have pushed any British prime minister in a westward-leaning direction.
The determination of the Bush administration to go to war did force a difficult choice upon the UK leadership -with little chance of persuading the Americans not to attack, the choice was to go along or risk the alliance -a dilemma that drives Preston's counterfactual at the beginning of this essay. Staying out would have been far from the cost-free paradise critics of the decision often seem to have in mind. However, the aspects of the environment pushing the UK toward war were balanced by the restraints on commitment -the hostile domestic political environment and the absence of international support. Other European states with security relationships with the US, most prominently France and Germany, took note of these difficulties and refused to become involved.
There does seem to have been some latitude for a different response to that chosen by However, perhaps we are being unnecessarily ambitious in reaching back into history for clues as to how a different prime minister would have dealt with Iraq. There is, after all, substantial evidence that members of Blair's cabinet at the time were uneasy with his policy choices. The distress of Robin Cook and Clare Short has been well documented 33 , and it is safe to assume that neither would have made the choices on Iraq that Blair did. It is also, however, true to say that such an extensive rewriting of history would be necessary to place either figure in the prime minister's chair that the counterfactual is of limited utility.
A more plausible premise, and hence more useful counterfactual, concerns Jack Straw, who as Blair's foreign secretary cannot be considered a marginal figure Chris Smith, another former cabinet minister who worked with both Brown and Blair, says that Brown "probably wouldn't have done it", and that Brown would have fashioned a relationship with the Bush administration that was "cordial, but a little more candid".
However, Smith is quick to add, this is "pure speculation" 40 .
Conclusion
What difference did Blair make to British foreign policy from 1997-2007? The question requires us to take full account of those factors of personality and worldview that condition the choices made by political leaders. Blair, with a proactive, self-confident approach to international issues overlaid with a stark, black and white cognitive style, fashioned policy responses to the major crises he faced that accorded with his individual characteristics. In Kosovo, 9/11, and Iraq, Blair was consistently in the forward end of the troupe, arguing in favor of the more ambitious of the available policy options. Blair, but cannot know for sure and so this will not satisfy those who believe individual personality to be either irrelevant or epiphenomenal. Indeed, I have argued that Blair's response to 9/11 was, at least in its broad outlines, situationally-determined and that his personality was responsible only for the largely rhetorical (as it turns out) features of a pledge to address the root causes of terrorism and for a lot of talk about good and evil.
When making the case for the importance of individuals, one must not get carried away and forget the environmental imperatives that would bear on anyone in a given situation.
Taken as a whole, Blair's choices over his decade in office demonstrate and illuminate the ways in which strong-willed individuals, holding distinctive beliefs concerning international affairs, can shape the direction of events. Britain, it seems fair to conclude, would have been a different actor on the international stage had someone else been prime minister for those ten years.
